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| Strategic View |
| by S Raghotham |
| Even as new comminication technologies shrink the world into a global
village, the proliferation of multiple sources of news and information is
producing a daily excess of information on critical issues. CDISS
endeavours to organise and make sense of this deluge of
information through two new initiatives. Hyperlinked headlines
of critical new events, updated daily Monday to Friday, can be found on
the What's
New page of the CDISS website. 'Strategic View',
a periodic column, will offer a view from the 'high ground' of
international politics and security. It will concern itself mainly
with the dynamics, in a 'grand strategic' sense, between existing and
emerging major world powers. |
EU's embrace of China
pushes US to play 'India card' 9th April 2005
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The Irresistible Force Proposes to the
Immovable Object S. Raghotham
18 July 2005
Some 18 months ago, I asked a
Lieutenant-General of the Indian Army: What, from the Indian military’s
point of view, would it take for India to enter into a strategic alliance
with the US? Talk of such an alliance was all around in New Delhi and
Washington, and an unprecedented series of India-US military exercises had
taken place in the preceding months. The officer had been secretary to the
Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee (the equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff) and was knowledgeable about the ongoing US-Indian military
relationship. He explained that the first requirement would be that the US
would have to treat India as an equal partner in the alliance, not as a
junior, although India did recognise the US as possessing superior
military capability. Next, he explained that the US and India were on
mutually inverted pyramids of priorities. India wanted the relationship to
begin with the US supplying high military technology and arms, thus
demonstrating that it trusted India. Specifically, if the US would make
available transformative command and control and early warning
technologies, then the two would have crossed the rubicon. Signing up as
an ally would come last. The US, on the other hand, insisted that India
had to first sign up to such an alliance and prove itself trustworthy.
Defence and high technology trade would be the last step. If a strategic
alliance was to be built, he said, one of the two would have to turn its
pyramid around. He also explained that it was necessary that the US decide
quickly whether China was a strategic partner or strategic rival -- if the
US did want a strategic alliance with India, it had to hurry because
India’s economic relationship with China was growing rapidly and would
soon overtake that with the US and it would then make no sense for India
to act inimical to China. Moreover, the Chinese were also making overtures
to India.
In March this year, the Bush administration
decided that that last factor was becoming so rapidly crucial that there
was no more time to lose over inverted priorities. Condoleeza Rice
travelled to Delhi and offered US assistance to speed up India’s rise to
global power. Specifically, Rice’s proposals were: a strategic energy
dialogue including civil nuclear co-operation; revitalising economic
relations to include increased US investment and trade; a working group on
space co-operation; and a strategic dialogue on global issues, including
regional security, democracy promotion and stopping the spread of WMD.
Much of the Rice proposal was an attempt to broaden and speed up the
effort to transform the relationship with India initiated in January 2004
as the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’.
But Rice, visiting India just three weeks
before the Chinese Premier went to Delhi proposing a China-India strategic
partnership, made a new offer: US facilitation of India’s defence
transformation-- to include not just sales and co-production of F-16 and
F-18 aircraft but also, as a State Department spokesman explained,
‘‘transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early
warning and missile defense’’, some of the very high-tech items that the
US is striving to prevent Europe and Israel from selling to China. This
was, indeed, the core of the proposal that Rice had travelled all the way
to make. As the State Department spokesman later explained, ‘‘Its goal is
to help India become a major world power in the 21st Century. We
understand fully the implications, including military implications, of
that statement’’.
How serious the Bush administration is can
be seen in the alacrity with which it has dealt with matters Indian. For
one, even before Rice had left India, the US government granted licences
to Lockheed Martin and Boeing to sell and offer to co-produce F-16 and
F-18 aircraft to India. It has also reportedly given Lockheed Martin the
go ahead to sell the Patriot-3 missile defence system to India. The two
countries have now also signed a 10-year defence agreement that speaks of
a ‘Strategic Partnership’, envisages co-production and collaboration in
arms, freeing up of high-tech trade and defence outsourcing and,
unprecedentedly, even joint military operations (without reference to the
need for formal UN sanction) when such operations are in the common
interest.
Finally, four decades of ‘estrangement’ and
a decade of ‘courtship’ later, US-India relations have arrived at a
crucial point – the ‘irresistible force’ has proposed; the ‘immovable
object’ is thrilled, but not decided on whether to take the plunge just
yet or to merely intensify the courtship for a further period.
Intensify it certainly will as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh starts
his three-day state visit to Washington on July 18 and George Bush
reciprocates with a visit to Delhi a few months later. Exactly how far
along the two heads will take America’s March 2005 proposal for a US-India
alliance is difficult to predict.
While India’s domestic and international
environments are both pushing it closer to the US, Prime Minister Singh
still faces at least two major moral-strategic dilemmas that will have to
be resolved before he can sign India up for an alliance with the
US.
The Indian
Perspective For a long time,
Indian strategic analysts and politicians wished that all those
predictions since the 1970s of the impending decline of American power
would come true. But it did not happen. In the Cold War confrontation with
America, the Soviet Union bit the dust; in the 1990s just when its economy
seemed to be failing, America’s relative pre-eminence only increased, both
militarily and economically, on the back of a technology-led boom, even as
Japan and Europe declined. The top Indian leadership has now come to
realise that the US will continue to be the world’s lone superpower and
alone capable of acting as such across a number of dimensions of
international relations – military, economic, diplomatic, cultural,
technological, innovation – for quite some time to come. As India itself
grows from being a regional power to a global power and has learned how to
navigate through the US fostered global economic and security systems, its
leadership is better able to appreciate that it is for the most part
benefiting from those systems. It has therefore come to accept that
a globally pre-eminent America may be better than a globally pre-eminent
China or, at the present time, even a multi-polar world order. As a
result, although India does still seek a multi-polar world order, it has
modified the sequence in which it wants this to come by – so long as it
looked upon America as an unrelenting hegemon which would do anything to
stay at the top, India sought a multi-polar world order here and now
and was willing to join the party later once it had the capability to do
so. Now, India is in a hurry to first become one of the poles itself and
then shape a multi-polar world order to suit its requirement. For this
sequence to work, India has to grow within the US fostered system and do
so quickly, efficiently and economically, with help from America
itself.
On the domestic front, India is approaching
its demographic peak. Unless it can get its economic act together and
build the fundamentals for growth now, its youthful population will not be
able to do much to power it into global powerdom. On the contrary, a
youthful, diverse, billion-plus population frustrated by a high
unemployment rate could endanger the very survival of India as a unified
nation. The upset results of the 2004 general election that brought the
Congress party back to power was a clear signal of a ‘revolution of rising
expectations’ already gathering. To keep that revolution from exploding
into a crisis, India has to jump onto an even steeper growth curve than
the present seven per cent rate and has to spread that growth evenly.
India is therefore now in an uncharacteristic, but real, hurry.
There is a realisation among the top leaders
of the two national political parties – the Congress party and the BJP –
that India needs to draw in massive amounts of investment and technology
to be able to achieve rapid growth. While one economist has estimated that
India would require over a trillion dollars of investment in
infrastructure alone by 2020, Prime Minister Singh has set a goal of
attracting $150 billion in foreign direct investment over the next decade.
The US is already the source of the largest amount of foreign investment
in India, but it is nowhere near the levels of American investment in
China or Europe. At the same time, no other country or economic bloc is
likely to be able or willing to pump in as much investment into India as
US direct and institutional investors could.
Secondly, since India’s growth is predicated
on exports, an important element of Indian foreign policy and diplomacy is
to keep overseas jobs open for its professionals and overseas markets open
for Indian goods and services. Again, the US is already the biggest market
for Indian technology services and for Indian technology professionals.
India’s biggest outsourcing companies, for instance, typically earn
between 60% to 85% of their revenues from the US market. Indian technology
professionals have consistently taken up nearly 50% of the H1B visas that
the US grants annually. But the outsourcing revolution is said to have
just begun. Over the next two decades, as workforce shortages grow in the
US, more than three million jobs are expected to be outsourced to India,
including not only technology and technology-mediated service jobs, but
also comprehensive business processes, high-end business consulting and
research and development jobs in the IT, biotech and nanotechnology
sectors. That’s an opportunity that India cannot afford to lose because if
it does, competitors in eastern Europe, Philipines, China and Russia will
move in and threaten India in what is now its best playing field.
Moreover, neither Europe nor fast-growing China offers India, even if they
were to become its strategic partners, comparable
opportunities.
Most importantly, if India can become a more
attractive destination for US investment and a manufacturing base from
which to export to the US market, the effect would be to free up US
strategic options with regard to China which are currently restricted by
the fact of its dependence on cheap Chinese manufacturing, aggravated by
Chinese currency control and leverage over the dollar due to its ownership
of US bonds. For India, that would be a double strategic gain – on the one
hand, it would boost India’s own growth and bring it to speed with China.
On the other hand, it would also give both India and the US more leeway
vis-à-vis their China policies.
A third requirement for growth is energy.
India’s energy imports are expected to rise from 70% of demand today to
85% of demand by 2020. Its strategy to meet the energy requirement is
mainly two-fold: one, to acquire energy – natural gas and oil – from the
Persian Gulf, Central Asia, African and Russian sources. Two, to increase
nuclear power generation by over ten times its present capacity. On both
these issues, but especially with regard to nuclear power, India needs
American co-operation. For long, India’s civil nuclear programme has been
hampered by American policies and championing of the global
non-proliferation agenda. But now, the Bush administration has signalled
that it is ready to ease restrictions and engage in civil nuclear
co-operation as well as give India access to other clean energy
technologies.
India and the US now also share common
international security and strategic concerns for the first time. For
instance, the rise of China potentially to superpowerdom is one of the
most worrisome prospects for India, especially if it should itself
continue to lag behind in economic growth and military modernisation. When
India looks around for friends that share its concerns over China and are
willing to act, neither Russia, India’s long-time friend, nor the
increasingly China-loving Europe come up on the screen. The one country
that does is America, and America is now seeking Indian partnership in
dealing with the rise of China.
Secondly, American awakening to the dangers
of Islamist terror and the black market in weapons of mass destruction
after the 9/11 attacks has raised hopes in India which has itself suffered
due to both. Although India and the US continue to differ on how to deal
with Pakistan in this regard, they share common goals and are co-operating
in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation at various levels.
Thirdly, as its economy grows in the coming
decades, both Indian exports of goods and services and Indian imports,
mainly of energy, are expected to grow several fold. India’s primary
security concern is therefore shifting from protecting land borders
against China and Pakistan to ensuring the security of sea lines of
communication in the Indian Ocean and ensuring stability in the Indian
Ocean region. This has been the area of greatest co-operation between the
US and India in the past several years. According to Henry Kissinger,
‘‘India wishes to ensure that no other hegemonic power rises between
Singapore and the Gulf of Aden. It is compatible with US interests…If
India conducts its strategic policy between the Gulf of Aden and the
Malacca Straits, the US will be generally
supportive’’.
Fourthly, India now realises that nearly all
of its security concerns arise from authoritarian regimes, whether in
Pakistan, China or Burma or in developing situations in Nepal, Bangladesh
and other regimes in the Indian Ocean region. Increasingly, therefore,
democracy promotion is becoming an important agenda for the top
leadership. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh articulated this growing view as
well as the reason behind it when he said recently that ‘‘Economic growth
and democracy will be the pillars of Indian foreign policy’’. The US has
for long tried to impress upon India that it should more actively promote
democracy and stability in its region. The Indian Navy and Air Force are
now building the capability for force projection and littoral warfare in
the Indian Ocean region, capabilities that India would need to shoulder
the burden. The Indian defence minister recently signed an unprecedented
agreement with the US in which the two sides agreed to undertake joint
military operations to achieve common national interests without inserting
what has been India’s favourite clause until now for such operations –
formal UN sanction.
Indian Dilemmas Despite all these areas of strategic convergence with the US,
however, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cannot simply sign India up as
America’s ally when he meets President Bush today. Apart from the burden
of the history of the relationship and the practical political problem of
anti-US Left parties being coalition partners in the present Indian
government, India as a nation faces at least two moral-strategic dilemmas
that it has not yet resolved fully.
One, to ally or not to
ally: One of the reasons Nehru, India’s first prime minister,
adopted non-alignment as the basis of India’s foreign policy was his
belief that India was too big to become an adjunct to another power.
Indeed, Nehru believed even in the 1940s that India would one day be one
of the top four powers in the world. He did not want to close India’s road
to such status by making her subservient to any other power. At the same
time, as a poor nation and one then just liberated from its colonial yoke,
all India had to preserve was its self-respect. A closed economy and a
foreign policy of autonomy were logical requirements of Nehru’s worldview
and strategy. Today, India is, both in its own self-perception as well as
in the perception of the other major powers, much closer than at any other
time to becoming a major world power. Should India now align with another
power and malign itself?
On the other hand, because the challenges
that India has to surmount still remain so difficult after over 50 years
of treading the path alone, there remain doubts if India can become a
global power if it continues to go it alone. After all, today, as a nation
that’s growing rapidly, India has to protect more than just its
self-respect. Indeed, if it were to act as if only autonomy mattered, it
would be guilty of destroying the chances of its own rise to world power
status and the chances of improving the living standards of its
billion-plus people. Self-respect and quest for autonomy would then start
to look more like egotism and false prestige.
Once again, India’s demography is a major
factor. Its youthful population is a double-edged sword – given education
and jobs, it can power India to superpowerdom. If denied those, it can
cause India immense suffering, perhaps even its disintegration. Large
amounts of foreign investment, technology, markets for its goods and
services, and foreign job opportunities for its people are all therefore
absolutely necessary for India. A ‘one-stop shop’, so to speak, for all of
these requirements is America. In an ideal world, investment, technology,
labour, and goods and services would flow freely between countries. But in
a world of competing powers, and particularly when a lone Superpower
determined to preserve its position feels increasingly threatened,
economic relations become hostage to power politics. To get these out of a
US that increasingly operates in a ‘be with us or lose out’ mode, India
will have to have a strategic alliance with it. Indeed, as one American
official mused recently as to why the US should put strictures on the
China-US economic relationship, ‘‘All of America’s top ten trading
partners, except China, are American allies’’. Two,
Asian Solidarity or bandwagoning with US: But allying with
America is a difficult proposition, and in the long-run may not be the
best policy to attain India’s long-term objectives in and for Asia. For
centuries, Asian quarrels have benefited outside powers and these outside
powers have played one Asian kingdom or country off against another. Since
the 1950s, America has at various times played India off against China and
China against India and for all this time has played Pakistan off against
India. It continues to play this game. Its strategic calculus for
maintaining global primacy for all times to come dictates that powers such
as India and China should be balanced off locally so that no one of them
ever rises to become a global challenger. Should India and China then
become permanent, but shifting, pawns in the hands of America? In that
case, even with all their economic and military might, would they qualify
to be called world powers in their own right?
On a more immediate level, even the most
pro-American of the Indian elites cannot help but admit that the US is a
very unreliable partner. As the Pakistanis say, America is a ‘fair weather
friend’. India’s own experience, especially with regard to its core
security concerns, continues -- even amidst all the recent presidential
level talk of strategic partnership – to be bitter.
But if India were to decide that it would
not be a pawn in America’s hands but would rather create Asian solidarity
and once for all break the region away from the games of dominance by the
West, can it trust China to co-operate in the long term. Nehru did try
this, but China responded by ‘teaching India a lesson’ in 1962. For over
fifty years, China treated India with contempt as a second-rate power.
Only in recent years has it started to show deference to India’s concerns.
But a key reason for this change itself is India’s growing co-operation
with America. Recent Chinese moves such as Premier Wen Jiabao’s attempt to
start a ‘strategic dialogue’ with India might well last for the next two
or three decades as China itself needs partners in its growing rivalry
with the US, but does China share the Nehruvian idea of long-term Asian
solidarity? The Chinese, after all, believe that they are the Middle
Kingdom and should be the greatest power in Asia, if not in the world.
China can come to dominate Asia only by undermining India’s position in
the long term. Indeed, this could very well be the motive behind the
current Chinese attempts to woo India – so that India can be distanced
from the US and then later dealt with as a lone power once China itself
has acquired the capability and confidence to do so. In which case, India
will have lost the support of the US and could also find itself far behind
China in economic, technological and military terms, and therefore
vulnerable.
Moreover, balancing against the US and
trying to build a multi-polar world order will be hugely difficult and
will entail great pain because the US will operate in a ‘with us or
against us’ mode across the spectrum of relations – economic, military and
diplomatic. It is especially perilous if India were to seek to do so in
partnership with the other votaries of a multi-polar world order -- China,
Russia and France – because even as they all seek a multi-polar world
order, they also need and seek a closer relationship with America than
with each other. |
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A Revolution in Space Affairs? - Part I
S.
Raghotham
15 May 2005
As it waits for George Bush to pronounce his policy on
the weaponisation of space, the world stands at a moment of
transformation. A combination of geopolitical/geostrategic change,
accelerating pace of technology and the ongoing innovations in military
thinking are launching back into space a part of the revolution that in
the first place came from up there. Bush is likely to give this trend a
hard push forward, but even if he does not do so, he is unlikely to either
seek or be able to reverse it. For, the drivers of this transformation in
space affairs are well underway and cannot be put back into the box and
shut.
Globalisation of Space in the Earth-Moon
System
For most of the Cold War period, the US and the former
Soviet Union were the only competitors that mattered in space and their
competition was driven primarily by military considerations. Since the
late 1980s, however, China, the European Space Agency (ESA) and India have
stepped up their space activities. All three have built up major launch
capabilities. China and the ESA are already players in the global
satellite launch market. India, which has the largest constellation of
remote sensing satellites orbiting the earth, is a major player in the
data services market. One of the few areas where Russia still maintains
world-leading capability is in space - both military and commercial. It
dominates the space launch industry.
As a sign of their growing capabilities and confidence,
they have all announced ambitious space ventures over the past few years.
China, for instance, is embarked on launching a series of remote sensing,
weather, navigation and communications satellites into high orbits. It is
already capable of launching a five ton satellite into geosynchronous
orbit and is now building rockets to double the capability. In October
2003, China became only the third nation in the world to have launched a
man into space on its own. This fall, it will send two taikonauts into
space for five days. China intends to follow this up with a second phase
between 2006 and 2010 during which it will achieve space docking and space
walking capabilities. By 2020, China plans to have its own 20-tonne class
permanent space station operating.
Russia is moving purposefully, amidst economic
difficulties, to replace its Soviet-era Soyuz manned vehicles with a
reusable spacecraft called Kliper. It is now being increasingly courted
for space launch and data services, including by the ESA. The ESA is
building its own global positioning system, Galileo, which in time will
evolve as a major challenger to the US GPS. Indias decade plan until 2008
includes several new remote sensing, weather and communications
satellites. India is also building its own global positioning system,
Gagan. It has signed up as Russias exclusive partner for the latters
GLONASS global positioning system, which it will help upgrade. India is
also in talks with the ESA to be a partner in the Galileo system, which
would serve its civilian navigation purposes.
In the 1990s, driven by the explosion of mobile
telephony, satellite bandwidth for the internet, earth-observation data
for commercial and development purposes and President Clintons decision
to open up the GPS navigation system for civilian use, private
corporations became major players in the space launch and data services
industries. This commercialisation has made it possible for even
non-space-faring countries around the world to make use of space
technology. Commercial success has spurred private corporations onto even
more ambitious, but ever more realistic, investments of hundreds of
millions of dollars to make space the next tourist frontier.
But the globalisation of space is most evident in the
military realm. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfelds commissions on
ballistic missile defence and space in 1998 and 2001, respectively, and
the 1999 Cox Report on Chinese espionage of nuclear and space technology
had already put military space affairs in the spotlight during the last
months of Bill Clintons presidency. Bushs 2001 withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty and the announcement of a multi-tiered missile defence system has
made a renewed Space Race virtually inevitable and has accelerated the
globalisation of military space. China is already making and testing a
variety of missile decoys; it is known to have programmes to build
ground-based lasers and kinetic anti-satellite weapons and has become an
early adopter of micro- and nano-satellite technology in its quest to
build orbital anti-satellite weapons. One innovative orbital weapon that
China is reportedly trying to build is a parasitic satellite - a
nano-satellite that would attach itself to a US spacecraft undetected.
When directed, it would eat up its hosts electronics and disable it.
Russia has for long had the capability to deploy ground
and space-based anti-satellite weapons as well as orbital nuclear weapons
such as the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) of Cold War
vintage. In 1975, the Soviets demonstrated the ability to disrupt American
satellites temporarily by hitting them with a low-intensity ground-based
laser. Now, Russia also has several ongoing programmes to build new
nuclear missiles - including one that would fly as a ballistic missile in
space but would have the low trajectory of a cruise missile when within
the earths atmosphere -- that would penetrate missile defences.
At least some of Indias remote sensing satellites - such
as the Resourcesat-1 launched in 2003 and the Cartosat-1 launched in May
2005 - are also useful militarily because of their high-resolution
capabilities. In 2001, India launched its first dedicated military
satellite. Called Technology Experiment Satellite (TES), it has been
beaming one-metre resolution pictures to the Indian military. It was a
star feature of a 10-day combined Army-Air Force exercise in May 2005 to
try out a new networked warfighting doctrine in a nuclear environment. In
2006, India will launch a microwave radar imaging satellite (RISAT), which
will give it observation capabilities at night and in cloudy conditions.
India reportedly has plans to launch six military satellites as part of a
$50 million project.
Following the American lead, the Indian Air Force has
announced a desire to transform into an aerospace force. Towards this
end, it is acquiring Phalcon AWACS and a number of UAVs that would be
integrated with space data links. A former air force chief is reported to
have said, and quickly retracted, that India is building a command
headquarters for possible future orbital weapons. What is well known,
however, is that India is keen to build a missile defence system for
itself. It is building components of an integrated air and missile defence
system indigenously. It has acquired the Green Pine radar and battle
management system for the Israeli Arrow anti-missile system but has been
unable to acquire the missile battery for the same due to American
pressures. It is now, however, in high-level talks with the US to acquire
the Patriot-3 anti-missile system.
Days before Chinas first manned mission in 2003, Japan
restructured its space programme in an effort to gain a higher profile.
Recovering quickly from a failed launch of spy satellites just a month
after the Chinese manned flight success, Japan recently launched a
communications satellite aboard its H2A rocket. JAXA, the new single
national agency for space, is shifting focus from conventional satellite
launches towards building a Japanese space shuttle to undertake manned
missions.
New Geopolitical/Geostrategic Factors
But it is not just low and high orbit space that is
becoming globalised. The phenomenon extends all the way to the moon.
President Bush wants the US to return to the moon by 2020. The
determination with which the US is pursuing interest in the moon can be
seen in the radical changes NASA is effecting in the way it does business.
In one such innovation, NASA has started to announce Centennial
Challenges - $80 million in prize money for technology innovations that
will help it ultimately to establish a self-sustaining lunar base. The
latest such challenge announced is a $250,000 prize for technology that
will pull oxygen out of moon regolith.
Japan wants to land robots on the moon by 2010. Soon
after, it will build a reusable space shuttle to carry out manned missions
to the moon. Japans plan is to achieve advances in robotics and
nanotechnology that would help it to have a manned lunar base operating by
2025.
Russias Kliper passenger spacecraft is expected to begin
taking humans beyond earth orbit in 2015 and is said to be capable of
flying to the moon and beyond. China plans to send lunar orbiters and
unmanned landers within a decade and lunar sample return missions by
2020. The ESAs long-term solar system exploration plans start with manned
missions to the moon in 2024. India is preparing for its first unmanned
moon mission in 2007. Called Chandrayaan (Moon Voyage)-I, the Indian plan
is to launch a remote sensing orbiter and land probes from several
countries. Both the orbiter and the landing probes will look for resources
- minerals, water/ice, helium concentrations. If the 2007 mission is
successful, the Indian space agency plans to follow it up with at least
one more lunar mission before 2015.
National prestige is certainly a key motive in the plans
for lunar missions and bases. While the US strives to keep its leadership
position and enhance that lead, the Chinese and Indian desire to be seen
to have arrived on the global power scene will mean a growing challenge
to the American position in space. Physicist Freeman Dyson perhaps
described the mood in Washington accurately when he said recently of the
US lunar ambition, If the Chinese push us, well move even faster.
Similarly, Japan finds it necessary to counter the growing international
influence of China.
But the more salient factor driving lunar missions is the
search for resources and this, indeed, will become critical in the decades
ahead. The epic scale of growth in China and India means that these
economies will need ever larger quantities of natural resources. Their
demand for oil, for instance, has already pushed up world prices to record
levels. This upward trend in prices is only going to accelerate in the
next two decades as the world uses up its known reserves of oil at a rapid
pace. According to the Worldwatch Institutes Vital Signs 2005 report,
China is now driving the consumption and production of almost everything,
threatening to deplete the worlds resources. Consequently, the costs of
raw materials are rocketing up in the world markets. As Indias
manufacturing sector expands, this situation will become critical. The
West and Japan now also have to reckon with the fact that for the first
time, China and India have the ability to project military and diplomatic
power far beyond their shores. As their economies grow, they will tend to
become increasingly involved in the politics and security of their
resource bases and lines of communication. Thus, key Asian and African
resources will become increasingly scarce or prohibitively expensive for
the West and Japan, although even China and India themselves will find it
increasingly expensive to acquire resources.
Meanwhile, the globalisation and commercialisation of
space has caused a continuous fall in the costs of space launch (cost per
kilogram in orbit) while technological advances are leading to gains in
capability per kilogram in orbit. The idea of exploiting space in general,
and the moons location and resources in particular, has therefore started
to appeal to many in the US and the other space powers. Indeed, in the US,
long-forgotten ideas from the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Solar Power
Satellite (SPS), are now being ferreted out and their feasibility
re-examined in the light of new technologies. Japan, too, plans to build
its own SPS by 2040. According to Jet Propulsion Laboratorys Dr. Neville
Marzwell, using existing technology, a Solar Power Satellite could
generate energy at a cost of 60-80 cents per kilowatt-hour, including
construction costs for the first system. In 15-20 years, this could be
brought down to 7-10 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared to 5-6 cents per
kilowatt-hour for conventional electricity.
An even more feasible and simpler idea gaining ground is
to beam solar power as microwaves from the moon. According to physicist
David Criswell, while building a massive satellite array in space to
capture and beam sunlight would require immense gains in technology and
costs that are still decades away, the natural base and resources that the
moon provides makes it both currently viable and indispensable for a space
solar power base.
The moon is also a rich source of helium that could fuel
a future nuclear fusion reactor. But not just energy, the moon will also
be mined for minerals and new materials. Indias lunar orbiter, for
instance, is a remote sensing satellite being sent to find commercial and
strategic minerals. Japans space officials have said their hope is to
establish a base on the moon that could mine resources found on and under
the lunar surface.
As space historian Robert Zimmermann wrote recently, "We are at the
dawn of a new colonial age. The growing space competition between nations
is in many ways very reminiscent of the 19th century competition between
the European powers Today, a new list of nations - India, China, Japan,
Russia, Europe and the United States -- are throwing their resources at
space exploration in much the same way. |
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A Revolution in Space Affairs? - Part II S. Raghotham
27 May 2005
New Geography, New Missions
In the 1940s and 1950s, the US and the Soviet Union
coveted space as the ultimate High Ground from which to conduct surveillance and
reconnaissance, especially to watch each other as they raced on earth to
build and test bigger nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles. In
the 1960s, the first military communication, weather and navigation
satellites were launched into higher orbits. The two militaries started to
use satellites for nuclear command, control and communications and later
for missile guidance. Attempts were made during the late 1960s and early
1970s to build orbital anti-satellite weapons and missile defences, but
these were negotiated away. A combination of technological infancy and
military and political prudence limited the purpose of space to being just
the High Ground, and
a mutually open and shared one at that. Sustained military presence was
limited to the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and the military mission was
restricted to Space Support - that is, to launch space vehicles and manage the
satellites in orbit.
In the 1980s, the US military started to use space-based
assets across the range of military activities and geographies due to
three interrelated developments: one, the development in the 1970s of the
ability to network computers; two, the ability to launch and utilise
communications and navigation technology had matured; and three, advances
in computing technology gave missile makers the ability to put fast
onboard computers that gave missiles in flight the ability to react
quickly to guidance signals from satellites. These technologies together
made it possible for the US military to interact with US warfighters
across the globe in near-real time. They also made possible precision,
standoff warfighting. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the power of what
came to be called the first Space War. As the US military realised its benefits, it added
a second military space mission: Space Force
Enhancement - the use of space to enhance
warfighting capability on the ground, sea and air.
The Gulf War demonstration of high-tech warfare made the
Chinese sit up and worry about what they would have to encounter if they
attempted to take Taiwan by force as well as about increasing American
hegemony in the post-Cold War era. Since then, the Chinese have keenly
studied US high-tech warfare. The PLA has reformulated the Mao-era Local War doctrine to
Local War under High-Tech Conditions. As a direct consequence of that reformulation,
China has expanded and accelerated its space programme to include
navigation, remote sensing and increased surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities to gain information advantage. More importantly, since 1998,
China has focused intensely on developing micro-satellite capabilities
with an intent to build orbital anti-satellite weapons. In Chinese
calculus, the opening shots in a US-China confrontation, possibly over
Taiwan, would have to be its anti-satellite weapons destroying
Americas eyes and
ears in the sky and thus deny it information
dominance, the very foundation of US conventional military superiority.
The flattering attention bestowed by the Chinese on their
Space War made
American military and civilian strategists aware of both Americas dependence on space as well as the vulnerability of
its space assets. In their book War and Anti-War, the Tofflers quote Eliot
Cohen: In the Gulf War we faced no attempts to
blind or disable our satellitesIn the
not-so-distant future this may change. In
1993, the Chief of Air Staff told Congress that We simply must find a way to get on with the
construction of capabilities aimed at ensuring that no nation can deny us
part of our hard-won space superiorityWe can
limit our adversaries ability to use space
against us.
The Clinton administrations
National Space Policy statement in 1996 formalised this quest into a third
military space mission: Space Control - the Department of Defense would
maintain space control capabilities to ensure
freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom to
adversaries.
New Technologies, New Doctrines
But the Clinton administration did not put the plan into
action for two reasons. First, it preferred to treat China as a strategic partner. In
fact, through the Clinton years, China acquired technology not only
clandestinely through espionage, but the American administration itself
opened wide the technology pipe to China hoping that that would help
America engage China
as a partner. And, second, the Clinton administration also believed that
the US could continue to maintain its dominance in space by simply keeping
afloat the threat that if any other power sought to weaponise space or use
space against US interests in general, America would respond by
weaponising it on an unmatched scale.
In any case, the US military did not have an acceptable
plan that could be put into action in a time of declining military
budgets. Like much else concerning the US military, its space programme
too was heavily invested with Cold War attributes. It could readily be
described by the words big, heavy, multi-mission, complex, mission critical, long lasting and costly. Heavy, long-lasting and multi-functional satellites
would be launched into fixed, high and less-vulnerable orbits using heavy
launchers. The satellites would then be constantly monitored and
controlled throughout their life period from expensive, heavily manned,
ground stations. Both the launch vehicles and the satellites would have to
undergo several months of tests before they could be launched. Indeed, the
planning for all this activity itself had to begin years ahead. A Space Control capability
with these attributes could not be built within the $250 billion military
budget of the Clinton era. Even if it could be built, it would not work --
in space, where one cannot man and protect assets continuously and
permanently, agility and adaptability of launch and orbital systems and
spacecraft autonomy are crucial to the protection of space assets, and the
US space programme lacked these attributes.
Things have changed since then. In March 2004, retired
Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Donald Rumsfelds
Director of Force Transformation, proposed that the US military should
change the way it operated its space programme. Cebrowskis new business model is called Operationally
Responsive Space(ORS). The logic of ORS is that
space operations should move away from Cold War-era attributes of massive
size and gold-plated
technology towards the small and the fast and
the many. Massive, multi-function satellites
lifted by massive launch vehicles after long planning, production and
testing phases would be replaced by single-function micro- and
nano-satellites lifted into low earth orbits by small rockets that could
be launched within days, and ultimately within hours, of a military
request. That request itself would come from a tactical level commander
rather than from the highest military and political officers. In short,
every theatre commander gets his own micro- or nano-satellite whenever he
needs one.
If realised, this business
model for the ORS Space Support mission would
bring multiple benefits to the US military: first, it would reduce cost
and time of maintaining access to and utility of space; second, it would
ensure availability of space-based assets to theatre commanders whenever
needed and thus serve the Space Force Enhancement mission; and third, it
would serve to protect US space-based assets from enemy action in space
since the US would launch these mission-specific satellites only just in
time for the mission. Moreover, they would be so cheap and quick to
replace that the enemy would have no incentive to expend effort to destroy
them. Thus, it would serve one part, called Defensive Counterspace, of
the Space Control
(or Space Superiority) mission - that is, to ensure for the US military
its freedom of action in space.
To achieve such capability, DARPA awarded contracts to
nine companies last April to study if they could come up with a service to
launch 1000-pound class satellites into orbits 115 miles high with just
24-hours notice and at $5 million or less. In September, four of those
companies - AirLaunch, Lockheed Martin, Microcosm and SpaceX, were given
follow-on contracts to make preliminary vehicle design and demonstrations
by 2007. SpaceX, which already provides certain launch services at less
then $7 million, is expected to demonstrate a full launch later this year
with 48-hours notice.
The second part of the Space
Control mission is the ability to deny freedom
of action in space to adversaries, Offensive
Counterspace. The Air Force Space Command is
deploying technology and systems rapidly to achieve such capability. In
April, for instance, the US Air Force launched an experimental
micro-satellite, XSS-11. Its declared task is to rendezvous with
satellites already in orbit, inspect them and repair any defects. Once
launched, it stays up in orbit for 12-18 months. It only needs to be told
where the target satellite is. It then burns its own engines to scoot to
the target, inspects it and takes action on its own. Clearly, such a
satellite is more than a mobile repair service. It is a scoot-and-destroy
anti-satellite weapon. It can destroy enemy satellites by simply bumping
into them, by shooting an electromagnetic pulse to fry the targets electronics, or by shooting kinetic weapons.
This month, the United States Air Force awarded a $123
million contract to Integral Systems to build a Rapid Attack
Identification Reporting System (RAIDRS). The system will detect
interference with American satellites - both military and commercial - and
geolocate the source of the interference so that countermeasures can be
taken. The Air Force intends to follow this contract up with a second
larger contract to build a full-fledged system to monitor and protect its
space assets.
The Department of Defense gave a $5 million grant to a
robotics laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania to develop large
swarms of tiny
autonomous robots that could work together to search large areas of the
sky or ground. On the ground, they could be supervised to move over
unfamiliar and complex terrain; in space, they could be directed by a
ground operator to find and swarm towards a target.
The ability to identify the source of attack on ones satellites, on-demand spacecraft launch capability,
spacecraft autonomy and scoot-rendezvous-inspect-destroy capability, and swarming robots that can be directed
to surround and destroy a target are only some components of the Space Control capability
that the US is currently developing. It is doing so in anticipation of a
future when battles for supremacy on the earth will be fought in space as
well - just as, earlier, the European powers fought their battles for
European supremacy not only on that continent but over distant lands in
Asia and Africa. |
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Srinivasa Raghotham Srinivasa Raghotham is a
journalist and strategic analyst. He has written extensively on the
technology industry in India and co-founded a successful magazine,
DeveloperIQ. He has also been a columnist and writer on a wide
variety of subjects, ranging from business entrepreneurship to
international politics. He is currently a researcher with the Centre
for Excellence in Leadership, Lancaster University. He is interested
in '4 Revolutions' (in military, politico-strategic, social and business
affairs), '5 Technologies' (Bio-, Info-, Nano-, Energy, Space Technologies
- BINEST) and relations between the existing (US, EU) and emerging (China,
India) world powers. |
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