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Strategic View
by S Raghotham
Even as new comminication technologies shrink the world into a global village, the proliferation of multiple sources of news and information is producing a daily excess of information on critical issues.  CDISS endeavours to organise and make sense of this deluge of information through two new initiatives.  Hyperlinked headlines of critical new events, updated daily Monday to Friday, can be found on the What's New  page of the CDISS website.  'Strategic View', a periodic column, will offer a view from the 'high ground' of international politics and security.  It will concern itself mainly with the dynamics, in a 'grand strategic' sense, between existing and emerging major world powers.
EU's embrace of China pushes US to play 'India card' 
9th April 2005

 The Irresistible Force Proposes to the Immovable Object
S. Raghotham

18 July 2005

Some 18 months ago, I asked a Lieutenant-General of the Indian Army: What, from the Indian military’s point of view, would it take for India to enter into a strategic alliance with the US? Talk of such an alliance was all around in New Delhi and Washington, and an unprecedented series of India-US military exercises had taken place in the preceding months. The officer had been secretary to the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee (the equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and was knowledgeable about the ongoing US-Indian military relationship. He explained that the first requirement would be that the US would have to treat India as an equal partner in the alliance, not as a junior, although India did recognise the US as possessing superior military capability. Next, he explained that the US and India were on mutually inverted pyramids of priorities. India wanted the relationship to begin with the US supplying high military technology and arms, thus demonstrating that it trusted India. Specifically, if the US would make available transformative command and control and early warning technologies, then the two would have crossed the rubicon. Signing up as an ally would come last. The US, on the other hand, insisted that India had to first sign up to such an alliance and prove itself trustworthy. Defence and high technology trade would be the last step. If a strategic alliance was to be built, he said, one of the two would have to turn its pyramid around. He also explained that it was necessary that the US decide quickly whether China was a strategic partner or strategic rival -- if the US did want a strategic alliance with India, it had to hurry because India’s economic relationship with China was growing rapidly and would soon overtake that with the US and it would then make no sense for India to act inimical to China. Moreover, the Chinese were also making overtures to India. 

In March this year, the Bush administration decided that that last factor was becoming so rapidly crucial that there was no more time to lose over inverted priorities. Condoleeza Rice travelled to Delhi and offered US assistance to speed up India’s rise to global power. Specifically, Rice’s proposals were: a strategic energy dialogue including civil nuclear co-operation; revitalising economic relations to include increased US investment and trade; a working group on space co-operation; and a strategic dialogue on global issues, including regional security, democracy promotion and stopping the spread of WMD. Much of the Rice proposal was an attempt to broaden and speed up the effort to transform the relationship with India initiated in January 2004 as the ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’.

But Rice, visiting India just three weeks before the Chinese Premier went to Delhi proposing a China-India strategic partnership, made a new offer: US facilitation of India’s defence transformation-- to include not just sales and co-production of F-16 and F-18 aircraft but also, as a State Department spokesman explained, ‘‘transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defense’’, some of the very high-tech items that the US is striving to prevent Europe and Israel from selling to China. This was, indeed, the core of the proposal that Rice had travelled all the way to make. As the State Department spokesman later explained, ‘‘Its goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st Century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of that statement’’.

How serious the Bush administration is can be seen in the alacrity with which it has dealt with matters Indian. For one, even before Rice had left India, the US government granted licences to Lockheed Martin and Boeing to sell and offer to co-produce F-16 and F-18 aircraft to India. It has also reportedly given Lockheed Martin the go ahead to sell the Patriot-3 missile defence system to India. The two countries have now also signed a 10-year defence agreement that speaks of a ‘Strategic Partnership’, envisages co-production and collaboration in arms, freeing up of high-tech trade and defence outsourcing and, unprecedentedly, even joint military operations (without reference to the need for formal UN sanction) when such operations are in the common interest.

Finally, four decades of ‘estrangement’ and a decade of ‘courtship’ later, US-India relations have arrived at a crucial point – the ‘irresistible force’ has proposed; the ‘immovable object’ is thrilled, but not decided on whether to take the plunge just yet or to merely intensify the courtship for a further period.
Intensify it certainly will as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh starts his three-day state visit to Washington  on July 18 and George Bush reciprocates with a visit to Delhi a few months later. Exactly how far along the two heads will take America’s March 2005 proposal for a US-India alliance is difficult to predict.  

While India’s domestic and international environments are both pushing it closer to the US, Prime Minister Singh still faces at least two major moral-strategic dilemmas that will have to be resolved before he can sign India up for an alliance with the US.

The Indian Perspective   
For a long time, Indian strategic analysts and politicians wished that all those predictions since the 1970s of the impending decline of American power would come true. But it did not happen. In the Cold War confrontation with America, the Soviet Union bit the dust; in the 1990s just when its economy seemed to be failing, America’s relative pre-eminence only increased, both militarily and economically, on the back of a technology-led boom, even as Japan and Europe declined. The top Indian leadership has now come to realise that the US will continue to be the world’s lone superpower and alone capable of acting as such across a number of dimensions of international relations – military, economic, diplomatic, cultural, technological, innovation – for quite some time to come. As India itself grows from being a regional power to a global power and has learned how to navigate through the US fostered global economic and security systems, its leadership is better able to appreciate that it is for the most part benefiting from those systems.  It has therefore come to accept that a globally pre-eminent America may be better than a globally pre-eminent China or, at the present time, even a multi-polar world order. As a result, although India does still seek a multi-polar world order, it has modified the sequence in which it wants this to come by – so long as it looked upon America as an unrelenting hegemon which would do anything to stay at the top, India sought a  multi-polar world order here and now and was willing to join the party later once it had the capability to do so. Now, India is in a hurry to first become one of the poles itself and then shape a multi-polar world order to suit its requirement. For this sequence to work, India has to grow within the US fostered system and do so quickly, efficiently and economically, with help from America itself. 

On the domestic front, India is approaching its demographic peak. Unless it can get its economic act together and build the fundamentals for growth now, its youthful population will not be able to do much to power it into global powerdom. On the contrary, a youthful, diverse, billion-plus population frustrated by a high unemployment rate could endanger the very survival of India as a unified nation. The upset results of the 2004 general election that brought the Congress party back to power was a clear signal of a ‘revolution of rising expectations’ already gathering. To keep that revolution from exploding into a crisis, India has to jump onto an even steeper growth curve than the present seven per cent rate and has to spread that growth evenly. India is therefore now in an uncharacteristic, but real, hurry.

There is a realisation among the top leaders of the two national political parties – the Congress party and the BJP – that India needs to draw in massive amounts of investment and technology to be able to achieve rapid growth. While one economist has estimated that India would require over a trillion dollars of investment in infrastructure alone by 2020, Prime Minister Singh has set a goal of attracting $150 billion in foreign direct investment over the next decade. The US is already the source of the largest amount of foreign investment in India, but it is nowhere near the levels of American investment in China or Europe. At the same time, no other country or economic bloc is likely to be able or willing to pump in as much investment into India as US direct and institutional investors could.

Secondly, since India’s growth is predicated on exports, an important element of Indian foreign policy and diplomacy is to keep overseas jobs open for its professionals and overseas markets open for Indian goods and services. Again, the US is already the biggest market for Indian technology services and for Indian technology professionals. India’s biggest outsourcing companies, for instance, typically earn between 60% to 85% of their revenues from the US market. Indian technology professionals have consistently taken up nearly 50% of the H1B visas that the US grants annually. But the outsourcing revolution is said to have just begun. Over the next two decades, as workforce shortages grow in the US, more than three million jobs are expected to be outsourced to India, including not only technology and technology-mediated service jobs, but also comprehensive business processes, high-end business consulting and research and development jobs in the IT, biotech and nanotechnology sectors. That’s an opportunity that India cannot afford to lose because if it does, competitors in eastern Europe, Philipines, China and Russia will move in and threaten India in what is now its best playing field. Moreover, neither Europe nor fast-growing China offers India, even if they were to become its strategic partners, comparable opportunities.      

Most importantly, if India can become a more attractive destination for US investment and a manufacturing base from which to export to the US market, the effect would be to free up US strategic options with regard to China which are currently restricted by the fact of its dependence on cheap Chinese manufacturing, aggravated by Chinese currency control and leverage over the dollar due to its ownership of US bonds. For India, that would be a double strategic gain – on the one hand, it would boost India’s own growth and bring it to speed with China. On the other hand, it would also give both India and the US more leeway vis-à-vis their China policies.

A third requirement for growth is energy. India’s energy imports are expected to rise from 70% of demand today to 85% of demand by 2020. Its strategy to meet the energy requirement is mainly two-fold: one, to acquire energy – natural gas and oil – from the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, African and Russian sources. Two, to increase nuclear power generation by over ten times its present capacity. On both these issues, but especially with regard to nuclear power, India needs American co-operation. For long, India’s civil nuclear programme has been hampered by American policies and championing of the global non-proliferation agenda. But now, the Bush administration has signalled that it is ready to ease restrictions and engage in  civil nuclear co-operation as well as give India access to other clean energy technologies.

India and the US now also share common international security and strategic concerns for the first time. For instance, the rise of China potentially to superpowerdom is one of the most worrisome prospects for India, especially if it should itself continue to lag behind in economic growth and military modernisation. When India looks around for friends that share its concerns over China and are willing to act, neither Russia, India’s long-time friend, nor the increasingly China-loving Europe come up on the screen. The one country that does is America, and America is now seeking Indian partnership in dealing with the rise of China.

Secondly, American awakening to the dangers of Islamist terror and the black market in weapons of mass destruction after the 9/11 attacks has raised hopes in India which has itself suffered due to both. Although India and the US continue to differ on how to deal with Pakistan in this regard, they share common goals and are co-operating in counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation at various levels.

Thirdly, as its economy grows in the coming decades, both Indian exports of goods and services and Indian imports, mainly of energy, are expected to grow several fold. India’s primary security concern is therefore shifting from protecting land borders against China and Pakistan to ensuring the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean and ensuring stability in the Indian Ocean region. This has been the area of greatest co-operation between the US and India in the past several years. According to Henry Kissinger, ‘‘India wishes to ensure that no other hegemonic power rises between Singapore and the Gulf of Aden. It is compatible with US interests…If India conducts its strategic policy between the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Straits, the US will be generally supportive’’.    

Fourthly, India now realises that nearly all of its security concerns arise from authoritarian regimes, whether in Pakistan, China or Burma or in developing situations in Nepal, Bangladesh and other regimes in the Indian Ocean region. Increasingly, therefore, democracy promotion is becoming an important agenda for the top leadership. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh articulated this growing view as well as the reason behind it when he said recently that ‘‘Economic growth and democracy will be the pillars of Indian foreign policy’’. The US has for long tried to impress upon India that it should more actively promote democracy and stability in its region. The Indian Navy and Air Force are now building the capability for force projection and littoral warfare in the Indian Ocean region, capabilities that India would need to shoulder the burden. The Indian defence minister recently signed an unprecedented agreement with the US in which the two sides agreed to undertake joint military operations to achieve common national interests without inserting what has been India’s favourite clause until now for such operations – formal UN sanction.    

Indian Dilemmas
Despite all these areas of strategic convergence with the US, however, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh cannot simply sign India up as America’s ally when he meets President Bush today. Apart from the burden of the history of the relationship and the practical political problem of anti-US Left parties being coalition partners in the present Indian government, India as a nation faces at least two moral-strategic dilemmas that it has not yet resolved fully.

One, to ally or not to ally: One of the reasons Nehru, India’s first prime minister, adopted non-alignment as the basis of India’s foreign policy was his belief that India was too big to become an adjunct to another power. Indeed, Nehru believed even in the 1940s that India would one day be one of the top four powers in the world. He did not want to close India’s road to such status by making her subservient to any other power. At the same time, as a poor nation and one then just liberated from its colonial yoke, all India had to preserve was its self-respect. A closed economy and a foreign policy of autonomy were logical requirements of Nehru’s worldview and strategy. Today, India is, both in its own self-perception as well as in the perception of the other major powers, much closer than at any other time to becoming a major world power. Should India now align with another power and malign itself?

On the other hand, because the challenges that India has to surmount still remain so difficult after over 50 years of treading the path alone, there remain doubts if India can become a global power if it continues to go it alone. After all, today, as a nation that’s growing rapidly, India has to protect more than just its self-respect. Indeed, if it were to act as if only autonomy mattered, it would be guilty of destroying the chances of its own rise to world power status and the chances of improving the living standards of its billion-plus people. Self-respect and quest for autonomy would then start to look more like egotism and false prestige.

Once again, India’s demography is a major factor. Its youthful population is a double-edged sword – given education and jobs, it can power India to superpowerdom. If denied those, it can cause India immense suffering, perhaps even its disintegration. Large amounts of foreign investment, technology, markets for its goods and services, and foreign job opportunities for its people are all therefore absolutely necessary for India. A ‘one-stop shop’, so to speak, for all of these requirements is America. In an ideal world, investment, technology, labour, and goods and services would flow freely between countries. But in a world of competing powers, and particularly when a lone Superpower determined to preserve its position feels increasingly threatened, economic relations become hostage to power politics. To get these out of a US that increasingly operates in a ‘be with us or lose out’ mode, India will have to have a strategic alliance with it. Indeed, as one American official mused recently as to why the US should put strictures on the China-US economic relationship, ‘‘All of America’s top ten trading partners, except China, are American allies’’.
 
Two, Asian Solidarity or bandwagoning with US: But allying with America is a difficult proposition, and in the long-run may not be the best policy to attain India’s long-term objectives in and for Asia. For centuries, Asian quarrels have benefited outside powers and these outside powers have played one Asian kingdom or country off against another. Since the 1950s, America has at various times played India off against China and China against India and for all this time has played Pakistan off against India. It continues to play this game. Its strategic calculus for maintaining global primacy for all times to come dictates that powers such as India and China should be balanced off locally so that no one of them ever rises to become a global challenger. Should India and China then become permanent, but shifting, pawns in the hands of America? In that case, even with all their economic and military might, would they qualify to be called world powers in their own right?

On a more immediate level, even the most pro-American of the Indian elites cannot help but admit that the US is a very unreliable partner. As the Pakistanis say, America is a ‘fair weather friend’. India’s own experience, especially with regard to its core security concerns, continues -- even amidst all the recent presidential level talk of strategic partnership – to be bitter.

But if India were to decide that it would not be a pawn in America’s hands but would rather create Asian solidarity and once for all break the region away from the games of dominance by the West, can it trust China to co-operate in the long term. Nehru did try this, but China responded by ‘teaching India a lesson’ in 1962. For over fifty years, China treated India with contempt as a second-rate power. Only in recent years has it started to show deference to India’s concerns. But a key reason for this change itself is India’s growing co-operation with America. Recent Chinese moves such as Premier Wen Jiabao’s attempt to start a ‘strategic dialogue’ with India might well last for the next two or three decades as China itself needs partners in its growing rivalry with the US, but does China share the Nehruvian idea of long-term Asian solidarity? The Chinese, after all, believe that they are the Middle Kingdom and should be the greatest power in Asia, if not in the world. China can come to dominate Asia only by undermining India’s position in the long term. Indeed, this could very well be the motive behind the current Chinese attempts to woo India – so that India can be distanced from the US and then later dealt with as a lone power once China itself has acquired the capability and confidence to do so. In which case, India will have lost the support of the US and could also find itself far behind China in economic, technological and military terms, and therefore vulnerable.

Moreover, balancing against the US and trying to build a multi-polar world order will be hugely difficult and will entail great pain because the US will operate in a ‘with us or against us’ mode across the spectrum of relations – economic, military and diplomatic. It is especially perilous if India were to seek to do so in partnership with the other votaries of a multi-polar world order -- China, Russia and France – because even as they all seek a multi-polar world order, they also need and seek a closer relationship with America than with each other. 

A Revolution in Space Affairs? - Part I
S. Raghotham

15 May 2005

As it waits for George Bush to pronounce his policy on the weaponisation of space, the world stands at a moment of transformation. A combination of geopolitical/geostrategic change, accelerating pace of technology and the ongoing innovations in military thinking are launching back into space a part of the revolution that in the first place came from up there. Bush is likely to give this trend a hard push forward, but even if he does not do so, he is unlikely to either seek or be able to reverse it. For, the drivers of this transformation in space affairs are well underway and cannot be put back into the box and shut.


Globalisation of Space in the Earth-Moon System

For most of the Cold War period, the US and the former Soviet Union were the only competitors that mattered in space and their competition was driven primarily by military considerations. Since the late 1980s, however, China, the European Space Agency (ESA) and India have stepped up their space activities. All three have built up major launch capabilities. China and the ESA are already players in the global satellite launch market. India, which has the largest constellation of remote sensing satellites orbiting the earth, is a major player in the data services market. One of the few areas where Russia still maintains world-leading capability is in space - both military and commercial. It dominates the space launch industry.

As a sign of their growing capabilities and confidence, they have all announced ambitious space ventures over the past few years. China, for instance, is embarked on launching a series of remote sensing, weather, navigation and communications satellites into high orbits. It is already capable of launching a five ton satellite into geosynchronous orbit and is now building rockets to double the capability. In October 2003, China became only the third nation in the world to have launched a man into space on its own. This fall, it will send two taikonauts into space for five days. China intends to follow this up with a second phase between 2006 and 2010 during which it will achieve space docking and space walking capabilities. By 2020, China plans to have its own 20-tonne class permanent space station operating.

Russia is moving purposefully, amidst economic difficulties, to replace its Soviet-era Soyuz manned vehicles with a reusable spacecraft called Kliper. It is now being increasingly courted for space launch and data services, including by the ESA. The ESA is building its own global positioning system, Galileo, which in time will evolve as a major challenger to the US GPS. Indias decade plan until 2008 includes several new remote sensing, weather and communications satellites. India is also building its own global positioning system, Gagan. It has signed up as Russias exclusive partner for the latters GLONASS global positioning system, which it will help upgrade. India is also in talks with the ESA to be a partner in the Galileo system, which would serve its civilian navigation purposes.

In the 1990s, driven by the explosion of mobile telephony, satellite bandwidth for the internet, earth-observation data for commercial and development purposes and President Clintons decision to open up the GPS navigation system for civilian use, private corporations became major players in the space launch and data services industries. This commercialisation has made it possible for even non-space-faring countries around the world to make use of space technology. Commercial success has spurred private corporations onto even more ambitious, but ever more realistic, investments of hundreds of millions of dollars to make space the next tourist frontier.

But the globalisation of space is most evident in the military realm. US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfelds commissions on ballistic missile defence and space in 1998 and 2001, respectively, and the 1999 Cox Report on Chinese espionage of nuclear and space technology had already put military space affairs in the spotlight during the last months of Bill Clintons presidency. Bushs 2001 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the announcement of a multi-tiered missile defence system has made a renewed Space Race virtually inevitable and has accelerated the globalisation of military space. China is already making and testing a variety of missile decoys; it is known to have programmes to build ground-based lasers and kinetic anti-satellite weapons and has become an early adopter of micro- and nano-satellite technology in its quest to build orbital anti-satellite weapons. One innovative orbital weapon that China is reportedly trying to build is a parasitic satellite - a nano-satellite that would attach itself to a US spacecraft undetected. When directed, it would eat up its hosts electronics and disable it.

Russia has for long had the capability to deploy ground and space-based anti-satellite weapons as well as orbital nuclear weapons such as the Fractional Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS) of Cold War vintage. In 1975, the Soviets demonstrated the ability to disrupt American satellites temporarily by hitting them with a low-intensity ground-based laser. Now, Russia also has several ongoing programmes to build new nuclear missiles - including one that would fly as a ballistic missile in space but would have the low trajectory of a cruise missile when within the earths atmosphere -- that would penetrate missile defences.

At least some of Indias remote sensing satellites - such as the Resourcesat-1 launched in 2003 and the Cartosat-1 launched in May 2005 - are also useful militarily because of their high-resolution capabilities. In 2001, India launched its first dedicated military satellite. Called Technology Experiment Satellite (TES), it has been beaming one-metre resolution pictures to the Indian military. It was a star feature of a 10-day combined Army-Air Force exercise in May 2005 to try out a new networked warfighting doctrine in a nuclear environment. In 2006, India will launch a microwave radar imaging satellite (RISAT), which will give it observation capabilities at night and in cloudy conditions. India reportedly has plans to launch six military satellites as part of a $50 million project.

Following the American lead, the Indian Air Force has announced a desire to transform into an aerospace force. Towards this end, it is acquiring Phalcon AWACS and a number of UAVs that would be integrated with space data links. A former air force chief is reported to have said, and quickly retracted, that India is building a command headquarters for possible future orbital weapons. What is well known, however, is that India is keen to build a missile defence system for itself. It is building components of an integrated air and missile defence system indigenously. It has acquired the Green Pine radar and battle management system for the Israeli Arrow anti-missile system but has been unable to acquire the missile battery for the same due to American pressures. It is now, however, in high-level talks with the US to acquire the Patriot-3 anti-missile system.

Days before Chinas first manned mission in 2003, Japan restructured its space programme in an effort to gain a higher profile. Recovering quickly from a failed launch of spy satellites just a month after the Chinese manned flight success, Japan recently launched a communications satellite aboard its H2A rocket. JAXA, the new single national agency for space, is shifting focus from conventional satellite launches towards building a Japanese space shuttle to undertake manned missions.

 

New Geopolitical/Geostrategic Factors

But it is not just low and high orbit space that is becoming globalised. The phenomenon extends all the way to the moon. President Bush wants the US to return to the moon by 2020. The determination with which the US is pursuing interest in the moon can be seen in the radical changes NASA is effecting in the way it does business. In one such innovation, NASA has started to announce Centennial Challenges - $80 million in prize money for technology innovations that will help it ultimately to establish a self-sustaining lunar base. The latest such challenge announced is a $250,000 prize for technology that will pull oxygen out of moon regolith.

Japan wants to land robots on the moon by 2010. Soon after, it will build a reusable space shuttle to carry out manned missions to the moon. Japans plan is to achieve advances in robotics and nanotechnology that would help it to have a manned lunar base operating by 2025.

Russias Kliper passenger spacecraft is expected to begin taking humans beyond earth orbit in 2015 and is said to be capable of flying to the moon and beyond. China plans to send lunar orbiters and unmanned landers within a decade and lunar sample return missions by 2020. The ESAs long-term solar system exploration plans start with manned missions to the moon in 2024. India is preparing for its first unmanned moon mission in 2007. Called Chandrayaan (Moon Voyage)-I, the Indian plan is to launch a remote sensing orbiter and land probes from several countries. Both the orbiter and the landing probes will look for resources - minerals, water/ice, helium concentrations. If the 2007 mission is successful, the Indian space agency plans to follow it up with at least one more lunar mission before 2015.

National prestige is certainly a key motive in the plans for lunar missions and bases. While the US strives to keep its leadership position and enhance that lead, the Chinese and Indian desire to be seen to have arrived on the global power scene will mean a growing challenge to the American position in space. Physicist Freeman Dyson perhaps described the mood in Washington accurately when he said recently of the US lunar ambition, If the Chinese push us, well move even faster. Similarly, Japan finds it necessary to counter the growing international influence of China.

But the more salient factor driving lunar missions is the search for resources and this, indeed, will become critical in the decades ahead. The epic scale of growth in China and India means that these economies will need ever larger quantities of natural resources. Their demand for oil, for instance, has already pushed up world prices to record levels. This upward trend in prices is only going to accelerate in the next two decades as the world uses up its known reserves of oil at a rapid pace. According to the Worldwatch Institutes Vital Signs 2005 report, China is now driving the consumption and production of almost everything, threatening to deplete the worlds resources. Consequently, the costs of raw materials are rocketing up in the world markets. As Indias manufacturing sector expands, this situation will become critical. The West and Japan now also have to reckon with the fact that for the first time, China and India have the ability to project military and diplomatic power far beyond their shores. As their economies grow, they will tend to become increasingly involved in the politics and security of their resource bases and lines of communication. Thus, key Asian and African resources will become increasingly scarce or prohibitively expensive for the West and Japan, although even China and India themselves will find it increasingly expensive to acquire resources.

Meanwhile, the globalisation and commercialisation of space has caused a continuous fall in the costs of space launch (cost per kilogram in orbit) while technological advances are leading to gains in capability per kilogram in orbit. The idea of exploiting space in general, and the moons location and resources in particular, has therefore started to appeal to many in the US and the other space powers. Indeed, in the US, long-forgotten ideas from the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Solar Power Satellite (SPS), are now being ferreted out and their feasibility re-examined in the light of new technologies. Japan, too, plans to build its own SPS by 2040. According to Jet Propulsion Laboratorys Dr. Neville Marzwell, using existing technology, a Solar Power Satellite could generate energy at a cost of 60-80 cents per kilowatt-hour, including construction costs for the first system. In 15-20 years, this could be brought down to 7-10 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared to 5-6 cents per kilowatt-hour for conventional electricity.

An even more feasible and simpler idea gaining ground is to beam solar power as microwaves from the moon. According to physicist David Criswell, while building a massive satellite array in space to capture and beam sunlight would require immense gains in technology and costs that are still decades away, the natural base and resources that the moon provides makes it both currently viable and indispensable for a space solar power base.

The moon is also a rich source of helium that could fuel a future nuclear fusion reactor. But not just energy, the moon will also be mined for minerals and new materials. Indias lunar orbiter, for instance, is a remote sensing satellite being sent to find commercial and strategic minerals. Japans space officials have said their hope is to establish a base on the moon that could mine resources found on and under the lunar surface.

As space historian Robert Zimmermann wrote recently, "We are at the dawn of a new colonial age. The growing space competition between nations is in many ways very reminiscent of the 19th century competition between the European powers Today, a new list of nations - India, China, Japan, Russia, Europe and the United States -- are throwing their resources at space exploration in much the same way.

 

 

A Revolution in Space Affairs? - Part II
S. Raghotham

27 May 2005

New Geography, New Missions

In the 1940s and 1950s, the US and the Soviet Union coveted space as the ultimate High Ground from which to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, especially to watch each other as they raced on earth to build and test bigger nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles. In the 1960s, the first military communication, weather and navigation satellites were launched into higher orbits. The two militaries started to use satellites for nuclear command, control and communications and later for missile guidance. Attempts were made during the late 1960s and early 1970s to build orbital anti-satellite weapons and missile defences, but these were negotiated away. A combination of technological infancy and military and political prudence limited the purpose of space to being just the High Ground, and a mutually open and shared one at that. Sustained military presence was limited to the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and the military mission was restricted to Space Support - that is, to launch space vehicles and manage the satellites in orbit.

In the 1980s, the US military started to use space-based assets across the range of military activities and geographies due to three interrelated developments: one, the development in the 1970s of the ability to network computers; two, the ability to launch and utilise communications and navigation technology had matured; and three, advances in computing technology gave missile makers the ability to put fast onboard computers that gave missiles in flight the ability to react quickly to guidance signals from satellites. These technologies together made it possible for the US military to interact with US warfighters across the globe in near-real time. They also made possible precision, standoff warfighting. The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated the power of what came to be called the first Space War. As the US military realised its benefits, it added a second military space mission: Space Force Enhancement - the use of space to enhance warfighting capability on the ground, sea and air.

The Gulf War demonstration of high-tech warfare made the Chinese sit up and worry about what they would have to encounter if they attempted to take Taiwan by force as well as about increasing American hegemony in the post-Cold War era. Since then, the Chinese have keenly studied US high-tech warfare. The PLA has reformulated the Mao-era Local War doctrine to Local War under High-Tech Conditions. As a direct consequence of that reformulation, China has expanded and accelerated its space programme to include navigation, remote sensing and increased surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to gain information advantage. More importantly, since 1998, China has focused intensely on developing micro-satellite capabilities with an intent to build orbital anti-satellite weapons. In Chinese calculus, the opening shots in a US-China confrontation, possibly over Taiwan, would have to be its anti-satellite weapons destroying Americas eyes and ears in the sky and thus deny it information dominance, the very foundation of US conventional military superiority.

The flattering attention bestowed by the Chinese on their Space War made American military and civilian strategists aware of both Americas dependence on space as well as the vulnerability of its space assets. In their book War and Anti-War, the Tofflers quote Eliot Cohen: In the Gulf War we faced no attempts to blind or disable our satellitesIn the not-so-distant future this may change. In 1993, the Chief of Air Staff told Congress that We simply must find a way to get on with the construction of capabilities aimed at ensuring that no nation can deny us part of our hard-won space superiorityWe can limit our adversaries ability to use space against us.

The Clinton administrations National Space Policy statement in 1996 formalised this quest into a third military space mission: Space Control - the Department of Defense would maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if directed, deny such freedom to adversaries.

 

New Technologies, New Doctrines

But the Clinton administration did not put the plan into action for two reasons. First, it preferred to treat China as a strategic partner. In fact, through the Clinton years, China acquired technology not only clandestinely through espionage, but the American administration itself opened wide the technology pipe to China hoping that that would help America engage China as a partner. And, second, the Clinton administration also believed that the US could continue to maintain its dominance in space by simply keeping afloat the threat that if any other power sought to weaponise space or use space against US interests in general, America would respond by weaponising it on an unmatched scale.

In any case, the US military did not have an acceptable plan that could be put into action in a time of declining military budgets. Like much else concerning the US military, its space programme too was heavily invested with Cold War attributes. It could readily be described by the words big, heavy, multi-mission, complex, mission critical, long lasting and costly. Heavy, long-lasting and multi-functional satellites would be launched into fixed, high and less-vulnerable orbits using heavy launchers. The satellites would then be constantly monitored and controlled throughout their life period from expensive, heavily manned, ground stations. Both the launch vehicles and the satellites would have to undergo several months of tests before they could be launched. Indeed, the planning for all this activity itself had to begin years ahead. A Space Control capability with these attributes could not be built within the $250 billion military budget of the Clinton era. Even if it could be built, it would not work -- in space, where one cannot man and protect assets continuously and permanently, agility and adaptability of launch and orbital systems and spacecraft autonomy are crucial to the protection of space assets, and the US space programme lacked these attributes.

Things have changed since then. In March 2004, retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, Donald Rumsfelds Director of Force Transformation, proposed that the US military should change the way it operated its space programme. Cebrowskis new business model is called Operationally Responsive Space(ORS). The logic of ORS is that space operations should move away from Cold War-era attributes of massive size and gold-plated technology towards the small and the fast and the many. Massive, multi-function satellites lifted by massive launch vehicles after long planning, production and testing phases would be replaced by single-function micro- and nano-satellites lifted into low earth orbits by small rockets that could be launched within days, and ultimately within hours, of a military request. That request itself would come from a tactical level commander rather than from the highest military and political officers. In short, every theatre commander gets his own micro- or nano-satellite whenever he needs one.

If realised, this business model for the ORS Space Support mission would bring multiple benefits to the US military: first, it would reduce cost and time of maintaining access to and utility of space; second, it would ensure availability of space-based assets to theatre commanders whenever needed and thus serve the Space Force Enhancement mission; and third, it would serve to protect US space-based assets from enemy action in space since the US would launch these mission-specific satellites only just in time for the mission. Moreover, they would be so cheap and quick to replace that the enemy would have no incentive to expend effort to destroy them. Thus, it would serve one part, called Defensive Counterspace, of the Space Control (or Space Superiority) mission - that is, to ensure for the US military its freedom of action in space.

To achieve such capability, DARPA awarded contracts to nine companies last April to study if they could come up with a service to launch 1000-pound class satellites into orbits 115 miles high with just 24-hours notice and at $5 million or less. In September, four of those companies - AirLaunch, Lockheed Martin, Microcosm and SpaceX, were given follow-on contracts to make preliminary vehicle design and demonstrations by 2007. SpaceX, which already provides certain launch services at less then $7 million, is expected to demonstrate a full launch later this year with 48-hours notice.

The second part of the Space Control mission is the ability to deny freedom of action in space to adversaries, Offensive Counterspace. The Air Force Space Command is deploying technology and systems rapidly to achieve such capability. In April, for instance, the US Air Force launched an experimental micro-satellite, XSS-11. Its declared task is to rendezvous with satellites already in orbit, inspect them and repair any defects. Once launched, it stays up in orbit for 12-18 months. It only needs to be told where the target satellite is. It then burns its own engines to scoot to the target, inspects it and takes action on its own. Clearly, such a satellite is more than a mobile repair service. It is a scoot-and-destroy anti-satellite weapon. It can destroy enemy satellites by simply bumping into them, by shooting an electromagnetic pulse to fry the targets electronics, or by shooting kinetic weapons.

This month, the United States Air Force awarded a $123 million contract to Integral Systems to build a Rapid Attack Identification Reporting System (RAIDRS). The system will detect interference with American satellites - both military and commercial - and geolocate the source of the interference so that countermeasures can be taken. The Air Force intends to follow this contract up with a second larger contract to build a full-fledged system to monitor and protect its space assets.

The Department of Defense gave a $5 million grant to a robotics laboratory of the University of Pennsylvania to develop large swarms of tiny autonomous robots that could work together to search large areas of the sky or ground. On the ground, they could be supervised to move over unfamiliar and complex terrain; in space, they could be directed by a ground operator to find and swarm towards a target.

The ability to identify the source of attack on ones satellites, on-demand spacecraft launch capability, spacecraft autonomy and scoot-rendezvous-inspect-destroy capability, and swarming robots that can be directed to surround and destroy a target are only some components of the Space Control capability that the US is currently developing. It is doing so in anticipation of a future when battles for supremacy on the earth will be fought in space as well - just as, earlier, the European powers fought their battles for European supremacy not only on that continent but over distant lands in Asia and Africa.

Srinivasa Raghotham
Srinivasa Raghotham is a journalist and strategic analyst.  He has written extensively on the technology industry in India and co-founded a successful magazine, DeveloperIQ.  He has also been a columnist and writer on a wide variety of subjects, ranging from business entrepreneurship to international politics.  He is currently a researcher with the Centre for Excellence in Leadership, Lancaster University.  He is interested in '4 Revolutions' (in military, politico-strategic, social and business affairs), '5 Technologies' (Bio-, Info-, Nano-, Energy, Space Technologies - BINEST) and relations between the existing (US, EU) and emerging (China, India) world powers.